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Modern psychology has often been embarrassed by a certain well-
d ted skeleton for which Descartes ultimately gets the blame. This kcr ton is the bifurcation of human consciousness from the "real" 
erfd-or to play slightly upon the words, a modem instance of 
w;pping the flesh from the spirit. Since Locke and Leibniz, each 
5 bool of psychology has invented its own formula for restoring the 
:.ity of man, but most of these have had to compete with the current 
vocabulary. And the vocabularies have ·put man into contrasting 
dimensions-subjectivity and objectivity, secondary and primary qual-
ities, feeling and reality, mind and matter. 
Today a new movement in philosophy and psychology-pheno-
menology-emphasizes the phenomenon as the meeting point of I 
and World. It treats consciousness in its lively encounter with the 
ureal" world without reducing it "naturalistically" to the stuff of the 
world. Phenomenology has many of its roots in the complex history of 
mental and behavioral analysis. Many psychological systems have 
tentatively treated some of the aspects of behavior that phenomenology 
now claims as its special problems: the person's modes of encountering 
existence. 
Some of the seventeenth and eighteenth century English thinkers 
observed ways in which the act of perception itself colored or formed 
what persons saw; and Gestalt psychologists in the twentieth century 
supplemented these observations in their "field" theory. German 
thinkers from the eighteenth century to the present ascribed various 
powers of forming percepts directly to the mind or brain. Phenomen-
ologists, unlike contemporary behaviorists, interbeh,aviorists, neo-
Freudians and biosocial psychologists, treat behavior as it reveals 
this peculiar fact about consciousness: the coloration or meaning 
that phenomena typically take on for a human being confronting them. 
27 
This event of confrontation came into the spotlight for 
psychology through the works of Edmund Husser!, who 
and transformed the b·adition of German psychology. M 
today's practicing psychologists and psychiab·ists, particu~)' 
Europe, have accepted and modified his assertions; and t..; 
knowledge him as the father of the new movement. 
" In_ his Id~~s of .. Pu~e Z:,henomenology ( 1928) Husser) states 
conscwusness and Bemg are the same thing in his science, and 
they cannot be reduced to the categories of the empirical sciences 
aims to dislodge ~e "bias of naturalism" from the study of co~ 
ness. In Husserl_s _system,. the r~al world receives its meaning 
phenomena or ex1sting reahty ( selende) only as the intentional 
ing-p~·od~ct of an ego. ~. reality exists through "the dispensing 
meanm~ by a sense-glvmg consciousness. This consciousness 
somethmg abs?lute, not ~er~vative from a nervous system, sensorfuat. 
compl~x of ~~:e~ or socml_ mte~·course as every type of physiolog~eaJ 
~ehavwral, hbidmal or bwsoc1al psychology would have it. It 
mdependent of meanings bestowed categorically upon it from another 
som·ce. 
J:Iusserl ~ol~s ~hat consciousness as such grasps the objectively 
real m ~e~tam lim1ted forms, which cannot be studied empirically 
by an~lytz~?g the sb·u:tme of .?~jects, but only "phenomenologically • 
That IS, a pme conscwusness 1tseU, a person standing in conscioua. 
ness and not a te~hnician working from the outside, must analya 
the. forms of consciOusness. These are specifically the varying modes 
of time, space, matter and casuality. 
Husser! assigns to phenomenology "its own proper preserve• 
beyond the "positive sciences." It arrives there by the unique method 
he_ names "~idetic phenomenological reduction." The first step iJl 
th1s method IS to put the entire natural world "in brackets"-that is, 
to take nothing for granted about phenomena. The next is to coo-
centrate on what remains-the "phenomenological" forms of experience, 
form_s not adopted from "factual" experiences (Faktizitaeten). ID 
seeking these forms the analyst tries to determtne how phenomeaa 
typically present themselves to a normal ego; he seeks the essential 
forms of all possible empiiical facts, not generalizations from empirical 
facts. 
Husserl distinguishes essential form or eidos from individual 
existence. Several experienced objects may share a specific essence-
a form or meaning they have for a person-but each has its own 
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ble existence. To discover the eidos, Husserl examines unrcpc~ta normal consciousness does to the reality it confronts or, 
what t 1e·sc what reality does to the normal consciousness. What, 
h revet ' h 1 h · d I c k are the eidetic phenomenological forms? The ea t y mm , 
he as s, d l't · 'f 
f. ds experiences time, space, matter an casua t y m spect tc he 10 ' 1 ' " l'ty " Ph 1 · 1 
. . to alter these is to a ter a person s rea 1 • enomeno ogtca 
"'a)s, · ts today examine the diseased personality for deviations from 
thcrapJs . . . p h · they have estabhshed as the normal etdetic pattern. syc otic 
what di ll f ti' 1 l 
. di 'duals they discover, vary ra ca y rom compara ve y norma 
Ill VI ' d th . . d 
0115 in the way they apply these forms, an e vanation ten s pc~c consistent for a given type of behavior disorder. 10 How does a person form experience eidetically? Husser! con-
tends that "pure consciousness" performs "intentional acts" in which 
't attention is directed to real objects and grasps them as phenomena-
1th· 't i · in certain perspectives ( Abschattt~ngen). He agrees with a , . . 
Brcntano that attention determines the reality of a perception;. tt 
sives the perception Aktualitaet. Many sensory data present dunng 
an intentional act are merely marginal. Not focusing to a conscious-
ness of something, they are "dormant actualities" (Ina.ktualitaten ). 
ome entire experiences are not intentional because in them the 
consciousness is not directed to anything. The ego must meaningfully 
"glance toward" an object before an intentional experience, or cogito, 
can occur. On the other hand, in order for a cogito to take place 
it is necessary onltJ that the ego confront something; the object need 
not be real. Thus, as 1einong had maintained, not only perception 
but also fancy, will and approval are cogitos. Apprel1ended objects, on 
the other hand, are "objectified" intentional objects. 
Before Husser!, psychologists treated the subject of attention 
scnsationistically, concerning themselves primarily with separate sen-
ory reports, and collecting data about the physical conditions for 
perception. But he insists upon the unity of apprehension and thus 
continues the tradition of Kant and Herbart, who on this point 
opposed Locke and HlUlle and their successors. He assumes, unlike 
many contemporary psychologists, that the facts about conscious 
experience are of a different kind altogether than "natmalistic" data 
about the physical world. 
Husser! draws a sharp distinction between Being as Experience 
and Being as Thing. Like the nineteenth-century phenomenalists, 
he considers the starting place for knowledge to be the immediate, 
immanent experience. This experience guarantees the existence of 
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its object and of an absolute self. As a person feels himself . 
stream of experience, confronting an intentional object, he kn 10 
h ·c· ows e IS. ogito means at once I grasp (something) and I live. Like 
temporary phenomenologists, Husserl insists that, though in 
ing a~ object the ego experiences itself as absolutely real i ... t,lJhaslltr()JIIil~ 
essential components apart from its way of being related or no be~avin~. Present-day pheno~1enological therapy takes as its ~ 
pomt this fact of confrontation-the way the person encount 
world of things and people. ers 
In discussing phenomenological time (experienced time t-L-
than clock time), Husser} emphasized the unity of the s~eara~ 
. f th !Uaf consciOusness, a act at William James and Henri B 
also found important. Each new experience takes place in a =~ 
peculiar to the particular ego. Two individuals' streams of cons: 
ness have unlike essential contents. Thus the same Faktizataet occurs OUJ. ~ different phenomenon for eac.h individual, and its peculiarity she: 
~Ight on the nature of the entire sh·eam of consciousness in which 
It occms. 
Modern phenomenology takes up mental disorder at this point. 
It attempts. to .determine the character of the stream of consciousnea 
or the su~Jectlve ~orld of the patient in terms of specific essences 
or categones pecuhar to human consciousness. His distortion of one 
or more. o~. ~hese known. forms of consciousness may provide the key 
to pecuhantie~ of behaviOr that cannot be adequately understood by 
more ~onve~tional ~ethods of delving into the person's past or 
companng his behavior with well-known syndromes. 
. s~~ne. of the psychia~·ists who today are applying phenomenolog-
Ical pimcipl~s to psychtah·y are Eugene Minkowski and Henri F. 
E~enberger m France; Erwin W. Sh·aus, now in Kentucky; Baron 
VIktor von Gebsattel in Germany; Ludwig Binswanger in Switzer-
lan_d and Rollo May in New York. In his book on the new movement, 
Existence ( 1958) May has included articles by each of these men in 
which they eA1Jlain their theory and practice and submit case re~rts. 
. E.llen~erger outlines the three main types of phenomenological 
mvestigation now being carried on. The first of these is descriptive 
phenomenology. This approach is an attempt to describe carefully and 
accmately the subjective experiences of mentally ill persons and so 
to form a ~omprehensive impression of the world they actually live in. 
Th~ psychiatrist takes the statements of the patient at face value, not 
trymg to reduce them to what the patient "really" means or to interpret 
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"transference" phenomena. As he listens to his patient, he 
thc!Tl a~ correlate items in the report with any preconceived schemata. 
does n~ he may make the most effective discoveries by letting himself 
In fa? the "feel'' of the derangement that confronts him; he may 
~cq~ur( einfuhln) what is amiss long before he can verbalize it. 
1ntul: second type is genetic-structural phenomenology, developed by 
. kowski and von Gebsattel. Its aim is to define the basic disturb-
\hn · d · f th f b 
• 1•0 the consciOusness-a erangement m one o e orms y ance d ll which one encounters or is encountered by the world-an to trace a 
of the patient's symptoms and the content of his consciousness to 
this one disturbance. 
Minkowski analyzes the case of a schizophrenic depressive French-
an who lived under the nauseating delusion that the whole world 
:as in alliance to punish him for his "guilt" by saving up scraps and 
leftovers of every imaginable kind in order to stuff them all inside 
him on a certain fateful date unknown to him. Minkowski discovered, 
by Jiving with the patient day and night for several months, that the 
man lived in a world that had a peculiar sb·ucture of its own, a 
distortion of the normal phenomenal world of time and consequently 
of space. 
The man suffered from a paralyzing sense that all meaningful 
time progression had stopped; his life centered on a single fatal focal 
point, the date of which was unknown to him but imminent at every 
instant of his existence. His retribution was planned, by hostle forces; 
everything was planned. There was nothing left for him to do but pick 
out the pieces of the scheme and discover new evidences of it every-
where around him. He spent his time determining new sources of b·ash 
that could be used against him. By feeding his delusion he was devour-
ing his own life, his sense of moving creatively into the future. 
~finkowski attacked the illness at what he considered to be the 
aggravating instant-the distortion of the normal sense of progressively 
creating one's own future-and brought the patient to an understanding 
of the basic problem. 
Von Gebsattel analyzes the case of a boy who had a compulsion 
for cleanliness and, though constantly engaged in washing himself, 
never felt clean. He regards this patient as a person whose course 
toward self-realization, towards Becoming, is inhibited. The heart 
of a compulsion is not an irrational drive or mge, but essentially a 
blockage. No progression is possible in such a life. It is bound to the 
past; irrational guilt is slavery to the past. In the normal consciousness 
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life purifies itself by moving ahead through time and uaalfUI:II!: 
what was neglected or done poorly. In the compulsive '-'Vlu:sc:totiSQifllij• 
life is bound to some moment in the past or to the past as 
spending itself in the attempt to finish something which it 
never finish to its satisfaction. Consequently the compulsive itna 
is likely to be one of pollution versus cleanliness, the patient ~ 
futilely to clean up, tidy up his past so that he can some day direct 
himself with a clean slate toward the future. His behavior 
directed toward an Entwesen or de-essentialization, anti-ei 
formlessness; all else that he encounters besides the Unform, the con.. 
pulsive symbol, is meaningless for his life. And he himself 
oriented toward an Entwerden, a non-Becoming. In a sense he 
losing his soul, because he is losing his life in spite of all his efforta 
to reclaim it. The problem for therapy is not to rid him of the 
compulsive behavior, to alleviate it in some way, but to achieve 
a reconsb·uction of his consciousness, a new orientation to life. 
A third type of phenomenology is Categorical phenomenolog. 
Its aim is to reconsb·uct the inner world of the patient with respect 
to the way he experiences time, space, causality and materiality. 
Time is normally experienced as a flowing of life or Werdezell 
("becoming time"). The normal person feels himself to be engaged 
in Eigenaktivitat, connecting the past and the futme by his own 
activity and inmost drive to activity in the present. The future is 
"open" to him. He is projecting something more or less definite 
into it, projecting himself into it; and it is coming to meet him, 
bringing an expectation of fulfillment. Further, the normal 
person's time is "in~erted into the social, historical and cosmic time,• 
The mature person lives as a member of ever widening circles 
of community, as he senses other Werdezeiten parallel to his own. 
For some depressed persons time does not flow; the schizo-
phrenic's time tends to be very slow or nearly to stand still. For the 
manic, on the other hand, time races. The sense of Eigenaktivitat weak-
ens for many schizoid patients; they are not actively connecting past 
and futme. For tl1e maniac and many other psychopaths the future 
is 110t "open" for them to project a plan into; rather it is empty. For 
the depressed the future is "blocked." And the schizoid person 
cannot insert his time into a social, historical or cosmic time, hfs 
stream of consciousness is an isolated one. 
Space, Ellenberger says, is not phenomenologically the isotropic 
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h ti'cs where equal distances are a 'ke. t IS amso-f at ema ' th' . pace ,0 m h dimension has different values. And every . mg m 
trOpic -eac . 't ·elation to the body a mobile focal pomt. The 
· felt 111 I s I ' · h 
pace IS ti 1 arrangement are meanings for the subject to w ~m 
facts of spa ad L'mitations distances, directions , roads, boundanes, 
relate · 1 · ' " · t d theV are 1 ti' 'ty are the categories of experienced space, onen e 
· 5 e as c1 . d dearn~s He cites Binswanger's concept of ge~tmmter Ra~m, attune . 
spoce. . h · space characterized by ones own feelmg tone or 
whiC ts . . . ti 
space, . h It is felt as full or empty, expandmg or constr1c ng, 
o•ional pitc · · · di f the 
ern · .· h Binswanger reports that m orgamc seases o 11 w or uc . d · ho 
0 
t' t suffers deterioration of oriented space an m man-
. the pa Jen 
bralll . and schizoid cases deterioration of attuned space. 
. depresstve . . f I d . . 
IC· l'ty · a third form of consciousness: 1t IS e t as eterrmmsm, Causa J IS . . .· 
as intentionality. The melancholic pahent expenences 
s chance or 1· 1 f · f · d 
a. -'1 attsation as determinism· he has Itt e sense 01 1 ee an !most ~u c ' h h 
a . human intention. The manic tends to see c ance everyw ere, 
conscwus · s · d 
. h finds the future to be empty of meamng. orne paranOl Just as e · h · th · intentions in nearly everythmg that appens, ere IS 
cases see . h . . . t ti 
· ous will directing events at them Wit stmster m en on. an orrun f . , 
The fourth form phenomenology discovers or . consciOusness 
. · J'ty in which there are variations of conststency, color, 
IS matena I , b . t f . 
d lasticity These too tend to e cons1sten 01 a lightness an P · . 1 . 
iven disorder. For instance, the manic tends to see m rose co Ol , 
g th than in the pervading black of the depressed state, and to 
ra er d 1 'f 'ty 
sense everywhere a lighh1ess, sofmess, resilience an mu ti or~m. . 
Erwin Sh·aus relates psychiatric data of all of these vaneties to 
the various modes of confrontation, normal and abnormal. The 
rimary fact of experience is that I, the real total person, confront 
rhe object, the world, as the real Other. It is not just ~1y. senses or 
specific nerve energies that encounter reality; and It Is not an 
assorbnent of primary and secondary qualities that I confront. 
Unlike many contemporary psychologists, Sh·aus does not .speak 
of the I as an organism or an Ego, in the sense of a mere adjustor 
between rival claims within the psyche. He starts from .the .fact of 
relation. In experiencing the Other, what is important .Is dist~nce, 
direction, besetment, and the possibility of my behavmg actively 
toward it. 
Like Husserl, Sh·aus uses the example of walking around a~ 
object, each view of it being experience~ equally .as a phase ?f ones 
own existence in the continum of ones becommg. What IS most 
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worth studying is the way in which one is gripped by the 
and the way in which he addresses himself to it. One 
experiences the actual in its limitation-in those aspects of 
address themselves to his senses at the moment; and this uuuta,Ho.J 
points beyond itself to a fuller possibility. Since a person CAI.Je1"1l-• .....c 
his own time-sb·eam as Becoming, he expects to be able to aa11.,......, 
himself to the object in the next moment and know more of 
possibility. He expects to be able to act toward it reciprocally 
to sense it in other ways as it further presents itself to him. 
In some kinds of mental disorder Straus writes, "the character 
of reality is lost, because things can no longer be integrated into 
temporal order of personal existence," One of these derangelllentl 
occurs in mescalin intoxication, which heightens the existence of 
being influenced, overwhelmed and persecuted by the Other. Tbe 
individual cannot reciprocate. He grows more and more passive, 
and feels sensorily dependent on all that touches him. Time seems to 
stop and space grows boundless. 
Schizophrenia is another sort of breakdown of normal relations 
with the Other. The patient, in encountering it, does not go out to 
meet a reality which he expects to become more acquainted with 
in each moment, while retaining his own integrity and entirety, 
Instead, he experiences the world in a sequence of moments in which 
he becomes overpowered. Voices speak to him, but not persons. 
and these anonymous voices strike him violently. There are no 
boundaries between things and no measure of boundary. There is 
only the realm of the hostile Other and himself,, alone, defenseless. 
paralyzed, unable to respond and interact with the Other. The 
schizophrenic world is not a land of dreams withdrawn from reality, 
but an alien reality engulfing the individual. 
Schizophrenia, like all pathological variants of the basic re-
lationship l-and-the-Other, is a distortion of the basic phenomenal 
realities that give meaning to sense experience. The sense "modalities" 
are distorted. Each of tt.ese-touch, sight, hearing,-has been dis-
covered to have a certalli "phenomenological" way of occuring in a 
life of normal encounters; for the nmmal consciousness each modality 
has a certain way of imparting meaning which in pathological 
states deviates from this nonn. 
The tactile sense (which in normal encounter is felt as reciprocal) 
becomes the experience of being touched or struck irrationally, from a 
distance. Seeing (the sense in which a person is normally most active 
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·dering what be sees from a certain perspective 
and autonomous, :~al hallucinations, a sense of being blinded by a 
lflll\' occur as o~ ne or in some cases, of having images tru·own li~tht direc:~d a( ::e mos't immediate of the sense modalities. in_ its 
:lt or.e. So l the one which most of all suggests continUity) but a so . . hi m· . 
Jll istence 't pattern on a sequence m time. The sc zop emc 
d for 1 s · d f' hi h l'k depen 5 d nses hostile powers like wmd an 1re w c ' 1 e 
·ces an se til · 'bl hears ~01 assault and penetrate him but remain vola e, mtangi e, 
the voices, di'stance and showing no logical or dependable pro-
. · from a · ' bil'ty trtldng Th . each mode of sense perception a persons a 1 
. n us 1n 
gres 10 · f . nd meaningful encounters can break down. 
ake 1ee a . 
torn f these psychiatrists-though their te~hmques may vary-
All o . . tl tudy of this human capacity for real encounter, 
. neenng 111 lc s k d . 
are p•o . •t failures And they share a common hac groun m 
d treat1Dg 1 s · I' · ·u· 1 an . f phenomenology. They set out from Husser s Im a 
h theOJY 0 · " h "b · k t" th tural-t e . t "phenomenological reduction. T ey 1 ac e e na 
tandpom - · f · th t-
. f · w which b·ies to evaluate consciOusness wm e ou 
. f pO!Dt 0 VIC ' th h lth 
I IC " b' ti' 1 " They try to discover 1) what stance e ea y 
·d 0 JCC ve y. . . 
51 e, k to the world and his life and 2) how thiS stance 1S 
erson ta es d 1· · d th p · th specific modes of experience-the sense mo a 1ties an e 
taken m e 
forms of space, time, cause and matter. . . 
Like Husserl these psychiatrists assert that consciOusness giVes 
form to what it lives; it makes real the eidos of the worl~ encountered 
nd of its own existence. Existence, having soul or cons~wusness, mu~t 
a te essence, or it desb·oys itself. The phenomenologis~ regards t e 
cre:Son as responsible for his own becoming, and he tnes to unde~­
!'::nd and heal breakdowns in that responsibility. H~ sh~re~ th1s 
ense of the crisis of Being or Nothingness with the eXlstentialist. 
Phenomenology differs most basically from other. types of psy-
chology such as behaviorism, interbehaviorism, biosoc1al theory and 
neo-Freudianism, by trying to cope with that vague but total a~p~ct 
of personality, consciousness itself. Its m~thod i~ not a redu~~1~111:! 
one. Rather, its dangers lie in the totahty of 1ts scope, w. 1c 
nothing less than the entire orientation of the person to eXIStence. 
Its promise is certainly great, if only because it is fin~g a way to 
understand and heal mental disorder by a method whiCh s~ts out 
from a sense of ti1e dignity and significant destiny of human l~e and 
a conviction of man's ability to make significant encou~ters w1th t~e 
Other over-against him. In view of the forces active today m 
dichotomizing, mechanizing and isolating man, phenomenology seems 
to hold a promise well worth pursuing. 35 
